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Abstract
I offer a set of sufficient conditions for beauty, drawing on Parsons and Carlson’s 
account of ‘functional beauty’. First, I argue that Parsons and Carlson’s account is 
flawed, whilst falling short of its promise of bringing comprehensiveness and unity to 
aesthetics. Instead, I propose, the account should be modified to state that if an 
object is well-formed for its function(s) and pleases competent judges in so far as it is 
thus experienced, then it is beautiful. I argue that my proposal offers greater 
informativeness, comprehensiveness and unity––accommodating, inter alia, 
mathematical, literary, and moral beauty––whilst surviving reflective scrutiny.
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1. Introduction
The history of philosophy suggests that defining beauty is a daunting task. This may 
explain why, despite a resurgence of interest in beauty in analytical philosophy (see 
Danto [2003], Armstrong [2004], Nehamas [2007], Sartwell [2007], Scruton [2009]), 
scarcely anyone is articulating a theory of beauty by advancing necessary and 
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sufficient conditions.  Yet notwithstanding beauty’s elusiveness, and though seldom 1
attempted, perhaps we can make headway by offering sufficient conditions for it. 
In what follows, I argue that if an object is well-formed for its function, and 
pleases competent judges in so far as it is thus experienced, then it is beautiful. To 
this end, I briefly introduce Parsons and Carlson’s account of functional beauty. I 
then identify two worries; the first concerns the account’s claims to advance unity 
and comprehensiveness in aesthetics; the second involves counterexamples. I 
subsequently introduce modifications that address these problems, and argue that 
my proposal gains in theoretical merit partly by unifying still more disparate usages 
of ‘beauty’ than its predecessor––including talk of mathematical, literary, and moral 
beauty––whilst surviving reflective scrutiny.
2. Functional Beauty
Functional beauty can be captured by the following:
Functional Beauty (FB) = If an object, O, perceptually appears (looks) well-
formed for its function(s) to competent judges,
then O is (functionally) beautiful.
 Nehamas may seem an exception, judging by remarks like: ‘[the] judgement that you are 1
beautiful … is identical with the spark of desire’ [2007: 55]; or talk of an ‘analytical’ 
connection between beauty and love [2010: 206]. Yet that appearance fades when he 
clarifies that he is not concerned with ‘what it is to be beautiful [but] what it is to find 
something beautiful, in the phenomenology and not the ontology of beauty’ [ibid.: 205].
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I take FB to be an accurate, albeit formulaic, statement of Parsons and Carlson’s 
[2008] proposal, though some clarification is in order. 
First, I use ‘well-formed’ as a catch-all term for the garden variety of functional 
beauty that Parsons and Carlson identify [ibid.: 94–100]. By ‘form’, I mean the 
arrangement of an object’s elements and their interrelations, or the object’s design 
(compare my [2018b]).
Second, what matters for FB is the proper function (or functions) of an object, 
as opposed to whatever purpose an object happens to serve. Objects’ proper 
functions are those which can be understood as belonging to the object, as opposed 
to being incidental to it. The contrast is captured linguistically by the difference 
between an object’s ‘having function F’ and its ‘functioning as F’ [ibid.: 62–9]. For 
example, a bookcase has the function of storing books, though it can function as a 
piece of decorative furniture, or a display cabinet.2
Third, to explain how knowledge of function informs aesthetic experience and 
appreciation, Parsons and Carlson [ibid.: 91–4] draw on Walton’s widely accepted 
theory, whereby an object’s aesthetic properties depend, partly, on knowledge of the 
category to which the object belongs. Walton [1970] argued that if perception, or 
experience more generally, is often experience as; and if, plausibly, aesthetic 
 Parsons and Carlson [2008: 62–89] defend an account of function, which I cannot discuss 2
here. I also ignore other complexities like the case of multifunctional objects. These, I think, 
can be handled in different ways, depending on the case at hand: by seeing them in light of 
a unitary function, viz., realising a number of functions at once (as with Swiss army knives or 
sofa-beds); or by appreciating them in a pro tanto fashion (on which more below), by 
considering their form in light of functions X, Y, Z, etc. Either way, functions can either be 
weighed equally, or hierarchically; for a discussion, see De Clercq [2013].
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properties depend on our experience of an object’s base properties; then the 
category under which an object is perceived will affect our experience of its non-
aesthetic properties, and so also its aesthetic properties. This is because the 
category under which an object is perceived determines which of its properties count 
as standard, variable, and contra-standard.  If so, then, plausibly, the functional 3
category under which an object is perceived, i.e., its perceived function, can likewise 
affect its aesthetic properties. Cases where learning some object’s function alters our 
aesthetic judgement thereof support this claim [Dawkins 2006: 24; Parsons and 
Carlson 2008: 123–4].
Fourth, ’competent judges’ are individuals with considerable knowledge and 
experience of the relevant category and of how an object’s form is supposed to 
realise its function. Later, in articulating my own proposal, I will briefly elaborate on 
this notion, but for now, this seems adequate to accommodate what Parsons and 
Carlson have in mind in stating that what is required is knowledge and 
‘understanding … of how, or in what way, the object performs its function’ [ibid.: 94]. 
This point is important, since ‘functional beauty’ consists in an object’s appearing 
well-formed for its function, hence its appreciation requires not only knowledge of 
 Where standard properties are those partly by possessing which an object belongs to a 3
given category, and are shared by all or most objects in that category, e.g. being coloured for 
paintings; variable those in virtue of which objects within a given category differ, and which 
vary between members of a given category, e.g. a painting’s palette; and contra-standard 
those which ordinarily count against an object’s membership in a given category, and which 
none or only few of the objects within a given category possess, e.g. two-dimensionality in 
sculpture.
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what an object’s function is, but also understanding of how its form realises its 
function.
Finally, since FB only offers sufficient conditions and concerns a kind of 
beauty grounded in the function of an object, it is best understood in pro tanto 
fashion, meaning that an object can be functionally beautiful in so far as it looks well-
formed for its function(s), though also ugly in terms of its shape or colour. For 
instance, a bookcase may be beautiful in so far as it looks well-formed for displaying 
books, but ugly in so far as it is an unearthly green.
Now, most criticisms of FB target either Parsons and Carlson’s account of 
proper functions along with their claim that it is these that matter for FB [Murray 
2010; Stecker 2011]; or their appropriation of Walton’s account [Davies 2010; De 
Clercq 2013; Stecker 2001]; or FB’s reliance on categories, which render it 
inapplicable to artefacts belonging to no established category [Shiner 2011; Sauchelli 
2013]. But these concerns are peripheral to the truth and value of FB, which depend 
on whether it succeeds as a sufficient condition for beauty.
By contrast, FB’s attractions are many: it explains how knowledge of function 
enhances aesthetic appreciation, both a common feature of everyday aesthetic 
judgements, and a staple of classical and eighteenth-century aesthetic theories 
[Parsons and Carlson 2008: 1–30], albeit one evading recent writing in aesthetics 
[ibid.: 31–61]. Moreover, FB’s sufficient condition for beauty comprises an objective 
criterion, thereby parsimoniously enhancing unity and comprehensiveness in 
aesthetics by bringing together under a single principle the beauty of many different 
objects. Finally, FB accounts for informed aesthetic judgements about nature, which 
are liable to seem a matter of mere visual pleasure [ibid.: 111–36].
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Unfortunately, I think that FB fails as a sufficient condition for beauty. Before 
explaining why, I add two interpretative caveats. First, perhaps Parsons and Carlson 
should not be understood as offering a sufficient condition for beauty.  Nonetheless, 4
this is the best interpretation of their theory. Certain passages explicitly invite this 
reading, for instance, that on ‘Functional Beauty … some relation of form to function 
is sufficient, but not necessary, for beauty’ [ibid.: 45n; emphasis added]. Moreover, 
Parsons and Carlson’s is a philosophical account, defended by argument, examples, 
and responses to objections. Were it not offering a sufficient condition, but, say, 
claiming that people tend to find beautiful what looks well-formed for its function, 
their methodology would have been poorly chosen. Nor could such an empirical 
generalisation, as opposed to a philosophical theory, unify aesthetics, which is one of 
FB’s stated aims. Finally, the account is standardly read as offering a sufficient 
condition for beauty.  Anyhow, my main concern here is not interpretative. Instead, I 5
want to glean certain insights contained in FB by way of motivating my own proposal.
Second, a word on ‘beauty’. Philosophers often distinguish between a broad 
and a narrow sense of beauty [ibid.: xiii–iv; Scruton 2009: 16]. In the broad sense, 
beauty refers to positive aesthetic qualities in general, including the funny or 
amusing, sublime, or even creative and original (depending on one’s conception of 
the aesthetic). In this sense, works such as Giacometti’s Disagreeable Object, or 
Xenakis’ music may be called beautiful. In the narrow sense, beauty refers to a 
specific aesthetic quality and its subspecies. In this sense, beauty has traditionally 
been construed in terms of pleasure and well-formedness [Armstrong 2004; Sartwell 
 Glenn Parsons suggested so in his commentary on a version of my paper delivered at the 4
2017 American Society for Aesthetics Annual Meeting.
 Compare Stecker [2011] and Davies [2010].5
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2012; Paris 2018a; 2018b], and so excludes the foregoing examples, either because 
they are not pleasing, or because they are incoherent, disharmonious etc., by 
contrast to artworks like Cezanne’s bathers or Beethoven’s early quartets.
It is not obvious which sense of beauty Parsons and Carlson intend. They say 
that by ‘beauty’ they mean ‘aesthetic appeal in general’ [2008: xiii]. Now, ‘appeal’ has 
clear connotations of the attractive and pleasurable, indicating the narrow sense of 
beauty, while ‘in general’ seems suggestive of the broad sense of beauty. Then 
again, FB places considerable emphasis on form, or how the object is designed to 
realise its function, harkening back to the narrow sense of beauty [ibid.: 45n, 90–
110]. It thus looks like Parsons and Carlson want both the comprehensiveness of the 
broad sense and the links to pleasure and form, associated with the narrow sense of 
beauty. Therefore my counterexamples below, taken together, are designed to weigh 
against FB regardless of the sense of beauty intended. 
As for my own proposal, articulated below, it is, I think, best seen as offering 
sufficient conditions for beauty in the narrower sense. While still quite broad, I take it 
to reflect the sense in which ‘beauty’ was standardly used in eighteenth-century 
aesthetics. Moreover, I take it that the combination of form and pleasure distinguish it 
from several notions that fall under the broad sense of beauty, including the funny or 
amusing, which please, but the pleasure in which is plausibly not traceable to form; 
and those like the sublime, which are not necessarily pleasurable.
3. First Worry: Unity and Comprehensiveness
I begin with a relatively minor worry. A major theoretical merit that FB boasts is its 
comprehensiveness and promise to unify aesthetic theory, in offering an account that 
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captures, inter alia, talk of both beautiful natural objects, like plants and animals, and 
artefacts, including artworks, utilitarian objects, and buildings. 
Suppose that FB does unify the beauty of the aforementioned objects, thereby 
offering a measure of comprehensiveness and unity. Nonetheless, aestheticians are 
becoming increasingly sensitive to a broader range of usages of ‘beautiful’, 
comprising talk of beautiful chess or football moves, arguments, scientific theories, 
mathematical proofs, and even moral character (see Gaut [2007: 114–32]; Irvin 
[2008]; Saito [2007]; Scruton [2007]; Paris [2018b]). Now, seeing as FB is tailored to 
capture beauty in objects that have functions, and account for their beauty qua 
functional, one would expect it to be well-placed to accommodate talk of beauty in 
chess moves, mathematical proofs, theories, etc., assuming that these are all 
potentially beautiful objects with functions.  Alternatively, one would expect some sort 6
of error theory, explaining why these are not deemed candidates for functional 
beauty.  By excluding many potentially beautiful functional objects from its purview, 7
then, FB seems considerably less comprehensive and unifying of aesthetic theory 
than one might have hoped. So if an alternative proposal fares better on this count, 
that will be prima facie reason to prefer it.
4. Second Worry: Counterexamples
Now for a bigger problem: a range of counterexamples demonstrating FB’s failure to 
offer a sufficient condition for beauty.
 I defend this claim in my [2018b].6
 After all, Parsons and Carlson discuss why objects perceptible via the proximal senses are 7
excluded from their account [2008: 175–89].
 8
Assuming a meaningful distinction between the beautiful and the indifferent, 
many objects that are and look well-formed for their function seem not to be 
beautiful. These include road signs, which are evidently functional but not pleasing 
(or appealing); and simple metallic bookcases which, while robust and convenient for 
storing and displaying books, could hardly be plainer to look at. Similarly, although 
objects like garbage trucks, bins, toilet seats, urinals, tampons, and condoms are, 
and appear to be, ingeniously designed solutions to certain problems (one need only 
look at their predecessors to see this), they are paradigmatically aesthetically 
indifferent objects. Many objects that look well-formed for their function, then, are not 
aesthetically appealing.
More problematic still for FB are objects like torture instruments or 
concentration camps, particularly their gas chambers, which doubtless rank among 
the fittest designs for mass extermination [Sauchelli 2012]. These and other artefacts 
like Mayan sacrificial knives or breast rippers, may even seem rather charming at 
first glance. However, contrary to what FB predicts, upon seeing how aptly their form 
is tailored, respectively, to mass extermination, extracting human hearts, or ripping 
adulteresses’ breasts, they plausibly come to look ugly and displease us, no matter 
how fit for their functions they look.
Consider also pornography, much of which is, and looks, highly fit for its 
function of sexually arousing audiences and providing outlets for their sexual 
fantasies; most pornographic films are full of objects of sexual desire, performed 
convincingly by physically attractive actors, filmed in ways carefully selected to 
highlight erogenous features, enhance make-believe, etc. Still, it would be odd to call 
pornographic films beautiful because they look fit for their function (even if some are 
beautiful because of their visual qualities).
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Finally, many objects are designed to shock, scare, or disgust. Disgusting 
masks, splatter films, and the like, look very fit for their functions. Pictures and films 
abound, depicting entrails, bodily fluids, necrophilia, etc., in relentless detail. Surely 
such objects cannot fall under any acceptable extension of the beautiful or 
aesthetically appealing; after all, the disgusting is, arguably, a subspecies of the ugly 
and if, as is plausible, ugliness is the contrary of beauty, being well-formed to shock, 
scare, or disgust, are ways of being not-beautiful. So, either FB is false, or it turns 
out that on FB positively unpleasant objects can be beautiful the more ugly or 
disgusting they are, which is, effectively, a reductio.
If successful, these counterexamples show that some objects are simply plain 
or aesthetically neutral, regardless of how well-formed for their function they look; 
while others are unappealing precisely because of their well-formedness for their 
function. And while such counterexamples can be multiplied, hopefully the foregoing 
convincingly show that FB is false.8
5. A Revised Proposal
I have argued that FB faces numerous counterexamples whilst not satisfactorily 
contributing to comprehensiveness and unity in aesthetic theory. I now propose that 
functional beauty should be modified as follows:
Revised FB (RFB) = If an object, O, is 
(1) well-formed for its function(s), and
 I have given different counterexamples so that at least one of them will convince readers––8
this would suffice to conclude that FB is flawed.
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(2) pleases most competent judges in so far as it is experienced 
(in perception or contemplation) as (1),
then O is (functionally) beautiful.
As in FB, (1) should be understood in terms of ‘proper function’, though I do not wish 
to confine RFB to any particular account of proper function. Indeed, perhaps no 
single conception applies across all objects that can intelligibly be said to have 
proper functions. It is plausible, for instance, that while a version of intentionalism 
works for artefacts (see Baxandall [1985]), an evolutionary conception is needed for 
natural objects [Parsons and Carlson 2008: 69–74]; and some mixed account may 
seem more apt for culturally evolved practices such as rituals, dances, etc. (compare 
[ibid.: 74–80]). Of course, defending any such account would take me well beyond 
the remits of this paper. So, although I appreciate that no theory of proper function 
would be uncontentious, and while identifying objects’ proper functions is difficult, I 
implore the reader to allow for now that the foregoing are, in principle, possible, and 
that we can often specify, or at least plausibly speculate about, an object’s function 
even in the absence of a theory, partly by appeal to intuitions of the sort invoked 
earlier (section 2).
In (2), I intend the notion of a competent judge in RFB to incorporate 
knowledge of function, as in FB, but also a broader notion of expertise, in line with 
Hume’s notion of a ‘true judge’, comprising ‘[s]trong sense, … delicate sentiment, 
improved by practice, … comparison, and cleared of all prejudice’ [1777: 241]. 
Though not uncontroversially, I take Hume’s proposal to amount to a general account 
of expertise, the idea being that in so far as different kinds of objects can be beautiful 
[ibid.: 237–8] and knowledge is required to appreciate them, freedom from prejudice, 
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practice with, and comparison between objects of a certain kind are pathways to that 
knowledge, in turn shaping one’s discriminative powers and sensitivity to salient 
features of objects.  Moreover, following Hume [1777: 245–9], it seems to me that 9
when it comes to appreciating beauty, particularly that of human artefacts and 
practices, as opposed to abstract objects like mathematical proofs, expertise must 
additionally comprise a dimension of psychological and affective normality––
including moral variants thereof. For deviations from these will lead to 
misapprehensions of the objects in question and, ipso facto, inaccurate aesthetic 
judgements.  Unfortunately, I cannot defend these assumptions here.  10 11
Nonetheless, if one resists my assumption that a suitable judge of beauty is an 
expert of the sort Hume envisages, I am confident that plausible alternative 
construals of expertise will do just as well. So again, I ask the reader to allow me to 
assume that a story along these lines is, by and large, plausible. What is important is 
that a ‘competent judge’ is an expert relative to a given domain.  Consequently, the 12
good mathematician will be a competent judge of mathematical beauty, the literary 
critic of literary beauty, etc.
 After all, such qualities seem equally instrumental for expertly assessing a philosophical 9
argument, or an evolutionary biological explanation.
 Unless relativism were true, in which case my proposal still goes through, though most of 10
my critical discussion becomes redundant.
 Not least since much has been written on Hume’s essay; see, e.g., Kivy [1967]; Carroll 11
[1984]; Korsmeyer [1976]; Shelley, [1994]; Levinson [2002]. Elsewhere, I defend a link 
between moral and aesthetic properties [2018a; 2018b].
 In some cases, as with human beauty, normality may suffice; compare Paris [2018a: 645–12
6].
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Returning to (2), ‘experienced as’ is primarily intended to expand the mode of 
apprehension of potentially beautiful objects from that of perception to other modes, 
including contemplation (presumably competent judges will know how to appreciate 
a given object). However, the breadth suggested by ‘experience’ may seem to belie 
my earlier claim that I am concerned with a narrow sense of beauty. Now, while I am 
liberal with my use of ‘beauty’, because I think that this best fits critical practices, 
which include talk of beautiful wines, foods, etc., it would be a mistake to think that 
my account is susceptible to the worry that, for instance, there may be such a thing 
as tactile beauty. This is because RFB is concerned with form, and mere sensations 
lack formal qualities, especially formal qualities organised by a relation to function 
(see also Paris [2018b: 720]; compare Paris [2017b: 154–5]). Moreover, RFB 
precludes mindless pleasures from counting towards beauty, since pleasure in RFB 
is premised on well-formedness, which implies a contemplative dimension. Consider 
the pleasure one takes in a good bath. This is different in kind from the pleasure in 
RFB, because the latter is characterised at least partly by reference to an intentional 
object, whereas the pleasure taken in a bath refers to a pleasant sensation which, 
while localisable, characteristically lacks intentionality, in not being about, or directed 
at, anything in particular [Kripke 1980: 151–5]. So if, as I suggested earlier, the 
pleasure-and-form formula demarcates a genuine and central instance of beauty, 
then the breadth of ‘experience’ does not entail a broad sense of beauty.
Finally, the qualification ‘in so far as’ serves three purposes in RFB. First, it 
suggests that the response in question is non-inferential, grounded in the experience 
of the object’s well-formedness for its function, rather than an inference to that 
conclusion or knowledge of that fact. Second, it specifies that the intentional object of 
the pleasure is the object’s well-formedness, which is independent of personal 
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considerations concerning, for instance, whether or not one has any use for the 
object, or one’s purposes are served by it.  Third, it highlights the pro tanto nature of 13
the account, as explained in section 2.
6. Some Merits of the Revised Proposal
It should now be clear that RFB does not predict that the objects that served as 
counterexamples to FB in section 4 will be beautiful. For although some of them look 
fit for their functions, they are not such as would seem to please competent judges. 
Even in counterexamples where the objects may please competent judges, as is 
arguably the case with pornography, RFB does not predict that the object will be 
beautiful, because the pleasure in question is not traceable to the object’s well-
formedness for function but merely the depicted content. And if some of the objects 
that served as counterexamples to FB turn out to satisfy RFB, it seems far more 
plausible to grant that they are beautiful after all, because RFB is both more 
demanding than FB, and can point to differences between such objects and those 
that fail to satisfy it. Hence, I suggest, RFB, though not FB, offers sufficient 
conditions for beauty.
Additionally, RFB promises greater comprehensiveness and unity in aesthetic 
theory than its predecessor. For in substituting ‘is experienced as’ for ‘perceptually 
appears (looks)’, it can accommodate talk of the beauty of more objects than those 
available merely through visual (or indeed aural) perception. RFB thereby unifies 
disparate usages of ‘beautiful’, including talk of beautiful novels, people, artworks, 
 By this, I do not mean to preclude the possibility of someone adequately appreciating an 13
object while having a use for it. But in this case, her pleasure should pass a counterfactual 
test: it should persist in the absence of her personal purposes vis-à-vis the object.
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utilitarian artefacts, buildings, scientific theories, mathematical proofs, animals, and 
others. Indeed, virtually anything that has (proper) functions can be beautiful under 
RFB, even though not everything that has functions will be, well-formed for its 
functions though it may be.14
Moreover, while RFB construes beauty as a response-dependent property, it 
differs from, and complements available response-dependent accounts of beauty, 
according to which an object is beautiful if it elicits a certain sort of response in 
competent judges [Goldman 1995]. For RFB specifies the intentional object of that 
response, which serves as an objective criterion for beauty. This means that under 
RFB competent judges’ pleasure can occasionally be misleading, so an object’s 
pleasing some judges cannot suffice for counting an object beautiful.  Hence also 15
the need for a quantifier over how many competent judges an object should please. 
A majority quantifier, though philosophically somewhat messy, seems to fit well with 
actual practices, whilst being reasonably straightforward and acknowledging 
borderline or controversial cases.
RFB also differs from another recent popular psychological account of beauty, 
known as the processing-fluency theory. According to Reber and colleagues [2004] 
beauty is traceable neither to an object’s features nor a subject’s response, but what 
mediates between objective features like symmetry, clarity, and contrast, and 
aesthetic pleasure. This, they claim, is the ease with which a given stimulus is 
perceptually or cognitively processed, which is partly determined by speed and 
 It is worth adding that on the plausible assumption that beauty and ugliness are 14
contraries, RFB complements one of few contemporary accounts of ugliness [Paris 2017].
 In short, condition (1) is required in addition to (2): judges can get it wrong, especially 15
when it comes to the objective side of things. Because of this, or because in some cases 
there may be no fact of the matter, it is possible for (2) to be true while (1) is false.
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accuracy. A significant difference between RFB and the processing-fluency theory is 
that although the latter relates fluency and pleasure to objective features, it still 
leaves the intentional object of our pleasure unspecified. This is clearest in cases 
where either children’s and adults’ or novices’ and experts’ aesthetic preferences 
differ. While Reber et al [2004] suggest that these differences can be explained by 
appeal to factors like repeated exposure to different stimuli, it remains unclear 
whether the intentional object of the pleasure that these subjects take in what they 
call beautiful is the same or different––in other words, whether learning, etc. reorient 
our attention rather than merely changing the fluency with which a given stimulus is 
processed. This is unsurprising, given that processing fluency concerns the 
mechanism mediating between an object’s features and the pleasure that prompts 
subjects to call it beautiful. So even if it turns out to be necessary, fluency is not 
sufficient for beauty, and cannot specify features of the object responsible for it.
Relatedly, while RFB is a philosophical, and normative, account of beauty, 
processing fluency is an empirical or descriptive account. While not making the latter 
any less interesting, this suggests that the processing-fluency theory cannot alone 
distinguish between correct and incorrect attributions of beauty. What is more, 
processing fluency and the positive affect associated with it are not distinctive of 
experiencing beautiful objects, but also familiar objects, true propositions, and 
unreflective judgements of preference and liking. So, the account leaves open the 
question of what differentiates between these different judgements. By contrast, RFB 
delineates the scope of pleasure in the (functionally) beautiful by specifying its 
intentional object. That said, it would certainly be interesting to test whether the 
relationship between (1) and (2) in RFB may also be characterised by processing 
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fluency, but that, of course, is a task for another paper. Thus, while compatible with 
the processing-fluency account, RFB differs in its aim and scope.
Partly on the basis of the foregoing, I think that RFB is richer and more 
informative than comparable alternatives. But there is more: RFB boasts 
considerable explanatory force, whilst contributing to comprehensiveness and unity 
in aesthetics. To show this, I will briefly illustrate how RFB handles three tricky cases: 
mathematical, literary, and moral beauty.
Mathematicians routinely speak of beautiful theorems and proofs (see Hardy 
[1940: 84–115]). Whether such talk is genuinely aesthetic, whether mathematicians 
mean anything more than just pleasure when they use ‘beautiful’, etc., remain 
unanswered questions. It would thus help if an account of beauty captured talk of 
mathematical beauty alongside other, less peripheral, usages.  While FB cannot 16
allow for mathematical beauty, because it is restricted to perceptible objects, RFB 
can accommodate such talk. But there is further reason why RFB is a better fit for 
mathematical beauty than FB. Recently, Inglis and Aberdein [2015] enquired into 
whether talk of the beauty of proofs correlates with their simplicity, usefulness, or 
features indicative of ‘epistemic value’ (such as how plausible or enlightening a proof 
is). They collected a list of 80 adjectives frequently used to describe proofs and 
asked 255 mathematicians to recall a proof that they recently encountered, and 
indicate how accurately each adjective described that proof, by rating its accuracy on 
a five-point Likert scale (from ‘very inaccurately’ to ‘very accurately’). The results 
were entered into factor analyses; these supported extracting four factors. Perhaps 
surprisingly, adjectives related to the simplicity, usefulness, or epistemic value of the 
 Admittedly this would not show such usage to be genuinely aesthetic, unless the account 16
in question were also true, on which more later.
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proof formed factors of their own, independent of those containing beauty and 
ugliness. Instead, beauty was clustered under a factor containing some adjectives 
indicative of functionality, (including ‘deep’, ‘enlightening’, ‘insightful’, ‘fruitful’, ‘non-
trivial’) and, unlike the other factors, adjectives indicating pleasure (including 
‘pleasant’, ‘charming’, ‘appealing’). Assuming that the factorisation of these 
adjectives was reasonably accurate, these findings indicate that, contrary to what FB 
would predict, and consistent with my previous counterexamples, not all proofs that 
are well-formed for their functions please mathematicians aesthetically or are called 
beautiful; yet some that are well-formed for their function are called beautiful, as per 
RFB. These considerations suggest that RFB, though not FB, can capture 
mathematical beauty.
The case of literary beauty further corroborates RFB’s contribution to 
comprehensiveness and unity in aesthetic theory. Although talk of proper functions in 
artworks may be resisted, there is a plausible sense in which artistic appreciation is 
functional. Consider, for example, Lamarque’s elucidation of literary aesthetic 
appreciation: 
Part of what it is to appreciate a work of art as a work of art is to appreciate it 
as an artifact designed for a purpose. … We ask: how does it work? How do 
the elements hang together to produce the desired effect? … All kinds of 
literary works are structured designs, and critics …  adopt a Principle of 
Functionality [whereby] all aspects of the design can be presumed to fulfil a 
purpose. [2009: 136–7]
 18
While this may be an apt account of literary appreciation, it seems implausible that 
successfully following a principle of functionality will yield beautiful literature. For de 
Sade’s The 120 Days at Sodom follows this principle no less than Eliot’s 
Middlemarch. Yet the former is hardly beautiful, while the latter is a paradigmatically 
beautiful novel. Thus FB fails to predict and account for what seems to differentiate 
between objects that are (let us assume) comparably well-formed for their function, 
rendering the one beautiful, the other not-beautiful. By contrast, RFB readily 
captures and accounts for the difference: whereas the well-formedness of de Sade’s 
work is not pleasing to experience or contemplate, that of Eliot’s work is. If this is 
right, then RFB seems well-placed to accommodate a considerable portion of literary 
beauty.
RFB can also accommodate the notion of moral beauty, which––tellingly––like 
functional beauty, was a hallmark of Hume’s and Smith’s aesthetics (see my [2018a] 
and Gaut [2007: 114–9]). Since I have articulated and defended the view that the 
moral virtues are beautiful elsewhere [2018a], I shall not elaborate it here. Instead, I 
will indicate how RFB may capture moral beauty. Virtues are plausibly human 
character traits (i.e., complex psychological dispositions, comprising affective, 
cognitive, desiderative components, in conjunction with internalised principles, 
beliefs, etc.) that are (especially) well-formed to realise certain (humanly good) 
ends.  Moreover, it is eminently plausible that contemplating the moral virtues (or 17
particular moral actions or characters) pleases us (provided that we are competent 
 While I cannot defend it here, this conception of the virtues is standard in the literature; 17
see, e.g., Hursthouse [1999]; Foot [2001]; Zagzebski [1996: 134–7]; Adams [2006]. So, my 
claim is that under this conception, RFB can accommodate the notion of moral beauty. 
Compare my [2018b].
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moral judges), especially once we grasp their design. If so, then RFB provides one 
way in which moral virtues can be regarded as beautiful, thereby accommodating a 
historically prominent usage of ‘beauty’, which many contemporary philosophers find 
puzzling.
Jointly, the foregoing showcase RFB’s impressive contribution to 
comprehensiveness and unity in aesthetic theory, alongside its informativeness and 
explanatory value.18
7. Objections to the Revised Proposal
In this section, I address six objections, by way of demonstrating that RFB 
withstands reflective scrutiny.
First, RFB may seem wrongly to predict that the funny or amusing is beautiful. 
For, whatever the precise recipe for funniness or amusement, it seems to involve 
well-formedness for pleasing an audience. So the funny or amusing appears to 
satisfy both conditions in RFB; but the funny is not the same as the beautiful.
However, I think that pleasure in the funny is rarely if ever grounded in 
experiencing an object as well-formed for arousing amusement or laughter. On the 
contrary, funniness plausibly depends on not being aware of how the form of an 
artwork or joke is tailored to amuse, and often understanding the latter may ruin a 
joke. However, if in addition to amusement, competent judges take pleasure in a 
joke’s well-formedness for amusing us upon acquiring the aforementioned 
understanding, then I do not see any obstacle to calling the object beautiful. Indeed, 
many of Buster Keaton’s films and some of Charlie Chaplin’s are quite beautiful, and 
 RFB can similarly be used to capture the beauty of, inter alia, chess moves, moves in 18
sports, arguments, and scientific theories, but I shall leave working these out to the reader.
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this beauty is plausibly traceable to our experiencing them as particularly well-formed 
for amusing us. But such cases, where there is pleasure in well-formedness over 
and above our amusement, are, I think, special. 
Earlier I suggested that artefacts like torture instruments are well-formed for 
their functions but not beautiful, and took this to count against FB, and hence to 
motivate RFB. Yet, a second objection goes, many weapons, including samurai 
swords, are exquisite in their aptness for their functions. Hence, it looks like the 
relevant counterexamples are not as successful as I thought.
In response, I should firstly note that my counterexamples did not include 
samurai swords, but torture instruments and sacrificial knives, which, I maintain, are 
still found not to be beautiful, or even deemed ugly, upon being perceived as well-
formed for their function. So it may well be that some objects, like samurai swords, 
are functionally beautiful, while others, like iron maidens, are ugly in so far as they 
look fit for their function. It still follows that FB is false.
However, this may seem ad hoc unless the difference between samurai 
swords and torture instruments is explained without begging any important 
questions. Now, part of the appeal of the example of samurai swords stems from 
their being undoubtedly elegant and graceful to look at, independently of their 
function, something that may not be the case with iron maidens, etc. If so, then given 
both FB’s and RFB’s pro tanto construal, samurai swords present no special 
problem, for they may also be ugly in so far as they are well-formed for killing. But 
there is another salient difference between torture instruments and artefacts like 
samurai swords, namely that whereas the former are evidently designed for 
destructive or immoral purposes, the latter are not, for they are equally appreciable 
as artefacts for martial arts or defence. This explains how they may even be beautiful 
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in light of their well-formedness for function, congruously with counterexamples to 
FB.
A third objection to RFB concerns sadomasochistic rituals or performances. 
Presumably, the function of these is inflicting pain and humiliation, and the more 
painful the design, the greater the audience’s pleasure. Moreover, in these cases, it 
might seem like the participants are competent judges. RFB would thus seem to 
predict that such performances are beautiful. This seems counterintuitive and many 
would deem such things ugly.
However, this assessment would be premature. For the sadomasochistic case 
is plausibly more akin to the case of pornography, in so far as the pleasure is one of 
sexual gratification at the intensity of the victim’s torment, rather than the form or 
design that brings this about. If so, then the sadomasochistic case is no 
counterexample to RFB, because the pleasure is not taken in well-formedness for 
function. 
But one might beg to differ. After all, there are appreciative communities that 
do take pleasure in the aptness of horror films to scare, splatter films to disgust, 
grotesque masks to repulse, and sadomasochistic rituals to inflict pain or humiliation. 
Moreover, members of such communities are best equipped to appreciate these 
objects. Hence, in so far as they take pleasure in these objects’ respective well-
formedness, RFB is committed to counting these objects as beautiful. 
Note that biting the bullet here would be a perfectly acceptable option for the 
proponent of RFB. But I think that proceeding thus would be a mistake. The reason 
is twofold. Firstly, while there are communities members of which are more finely 
attuned to grotesqueness or repulsiveness and take pleasure in these, I am sceptical 
about the sophistication of their responses, and the extent to which they are 
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grounded in an appreciation of design. Instead, I think that it is more plausible that 
such cases are akin to the sexual gratification model albeit not (necessarily) sexual. 
That is, the pleasure is a second-order response to the intensity of the first-order 
response (disgust, pain, etc.) elicited by what is depicted (in films, etc.) or done (in 
rituals etc.), or the ‘shock value’ rather than the form. Secondly, the aforementioned 
cases are ones that depart from a typical human psychology (compare Gaut [1993]). 
In other words, members of such appreciative communities are deviant and therefore 
fail to qualify as competent judges, since a normal human psychology is a sine qua 
non of competent judges. This is not a criticism of such communities, but an 
observation about our evaluative concepts, which are partly specified by typical 
human affect, from which sadism, masochism, and pleasure in the ugly and 
disgusting are deviations. So if my treatment of these cases is rejected, then the 
problem that emerges is not merely one for RFB but virtually any account of 
aesthetic or indeed moral value that centrally features affect, to the extent that these 
also construe values as to any measure objective.
But now a fourth objection lurks: some ancient cultures’ rituals featured 
human sacrifice. Presumably, many such rituals were well-formed for their respective 
functions, and competent judges would seem to be members of these cultures. We 
might also stipulate that these people enjoyed such ceremonies. Here, I could hardly 
claim that entire communities and cultures, like the Aztecs or Mayas, were deviant 
and so cannot qualify as competent judges.
True. But there are other reasons why these people cannot be seen as 
competent judges, so that their pleasure in the aptness of these rituals for their 
function is not criterial of beauty. Specifically, the function that those participants 
assigned to the performances in question, namely communion with, or blessings 
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from, the divine, in pursuit of things like more rainfall or improved crop quality, were 
simply not realised by killing people (or other animals). Hence the rituals in question 
were anything but well-formed for their function.
But an objector may insist that these rituals did serve some function, perhaps 
social cohesion or collective catharsis, identifiable retrospectively in light of insights 
from evolutionary anthropology. In response, I think that human sacrifice is at best of 
questionable value in realising these functions when compared to alternatives (not 
least due to its immorality). And although this is perhaps only knowable 
retrospectively, it still allows us to question participants’ status as competent judges. 
Nor would today’s anthropologists qualify, for they can at best only imagine these 
performances; or, where similar performances are ongoing, they rarely involve 
human sacrifice; and if they did, I doubt that they would please most competent 
judges. Anyway, it seems to me implausible that participants took pleasure in these 
ceremonies’ well-formedness for their function. Instead, it seems more credible that 
their pleasure stemmed either from their participation in an important communal 
event, or the fact that the ritual went as planned. But these sources are distinct from 
an object’s well-formedness for its function. Thus, RFB escapes unscathed.
Consider now a fifth objection. If there are no gods, and religious artefacts 
including ceremonies, music, etc. are supposed to serve the gods, then these are 
not functionally beautiful. Yet they do seem particularly well designed and, in some 
cases, like Bach’s Magnificat, exquisitely beautiful.
Many things can be said in response, but for brevity I restrict myself to the 
following. In the first place, the beauty of these works may not be functional. RFB is 
only a sufficient condition for beauty, so that there may be much beauty besides 
what is captured by RFB. However, religious artefacts also appear to be designed to 
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conjure corresponding sentiment (religious or spiritual) in audiences, and this seems 
to be a function that some religious works are remarkably well-formed to realise.  19
Hence, they may yet satisfy RFB.
Doubtless more counterexamples to RFB can be conjured, but the foregoing 
discussion serves to showcase the many strategies available to parry them. 
However, a final objection questions RFB’s theoretical usefulness and 
informativeness. The objector may point out that it remains possible under RFB that 
since the more ‘objective’ condition of the two (i.e., (1), which concerns an object’s 
well-formedness for its function(s)) is not, in fact, the ground of the pleasure, since it 
does not invariably ground pleasure. It may thus be objected that all that RFB says is 
that some experiences of well-formed functional objects please because the object is 
beautiful, whereas others do not, because it is not. So RFB risks being 
uninformative.
Pleasure is certainly important in RFB. However, RFB states that if most 
competent judges take pleasure in an object in so far as they experience it as well-
formed for its function, then that object is beautiful. This remains informative because 
it specifies the pleasure’s intentional object. RFB need not show that the beauty and 
pleasure in question are not orthogonal to the object’s functionality. Our intuitions 
and classifications of objects as beautiful, functional, etc., point to a connection 
between functionality and beauty, rather than the other way round; and in so far as 
neither pleasure nor well-formedness for function alone are sufficient for beauty, RFB 
still performs important and theoretically informative work in specifying a combination 
that is sufficient. In other words, as long as it is possible to take pleasure in objects 
for all sorts of reasons besides their beauty, and so to take pleasure in objects that 
 For a discussion of some relevant issues, see Sauchelli [2012]. 19
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are not beautiful, RFB specifies a subset of cases where pleasure in an object 
counts towards its being beautiful. Questions abound, of course, regarding the role 
of pleasure in judgements of beauty and the conceptual repertoire of aesthetics 
generally, but these are not reasons to question RFB––they are reminders that 
aesthetics is still in its prime.
8. Conclusion
I have argued that if an object is well-formed for its function(s) and pleases 
competent judges in so far as it is thus experienced, then it is beautiful. I begun by 
showing that Parsons and Carlson’s account of functional beauty leaves much to be 
desired by way of theoretical merit, whilst being open to counterexamples. Instead, I 
suggested that my proposal (RFB) promises improved comprehensiveness and 
unity, whilst surviving reflective scrutiny. I conclude that RFB offers a plausible and 
informative set of sufficient conditions for beauty.20
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